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Civil Code §§ 1695.4, 1695.5, 1695.6, 2945.3 and 2945.6 (amended).
AB 669 (Wright); 1997 STAT. Ch. 50
Civil Code § 2954.12 (enacted).
AB 1160 (Shelley); 1997 STAT. Ch. 65
Home ownership is an integral part of the American Dream.' For most home-
owners, the home represents both their largest asset and the largest extension of
credit that they will ever obtain.2 The typical consumer does not possess extensive
knowledge about the real estate market or home financing, and often defers
judgment to more sophisticated intermediaries.3 In order to protect the interests of
unsophisticated homeowners in California, the Legislature has enacted Chapter 50
to strengthen both the Home Equity Sales Contracts Act (HESCA),4 and the
Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants Act (MFCA).5 Additionally, Chapter 62 was en-
acted to strengthen consumer protection laws pertaining to cancellation of Private
Mortgage Insurance (PMI), also referred to as "mortgage guarantee insurance."6
1. 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02, 1559 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hansen) (explaining the
advantages for homeowners of pending Congressional legislation that would require the automatic termination of
Private Mortgage Insurance when specific conditions are met).
2. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695(a) (West 1985) (declaring legislative findings and intent regarding the Home
Equity Sales Contracts Act); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1086-87 (1984) (noting the disadvantages faced by unsophisticated home
buyers).
3. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1086.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1695-1695.17 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
5. Id. §§ 2945-2945.11 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); see SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 4 (June
17, 1997) (indicating that the purpose of the Home Equity Contracts Act is to protect innocent homeowners from
predatory equity purchasers); see also SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS oFAB 1160, at 3 (June 19, 1997) (indicating that
many borrowers do not understand their rights relating to cancellation of private mortgage insurance).
6. See CAL. INS. CODE § 119 (West 1993) (defining "mortgage guaranty insurance" as insurance against
financial loss by reason of the nonpayment of sums agreed to be paid under the terms of the note); see also id. §
12640.02 (West 1988) (further defining mortgage guarantee insurance).
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I. EXisING LAW PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 50
A. The Home Equity Sales Contracts Act
The HESCA and the MFCA were enacted in 1979 to protect property owners"
whose residences are in foreclosure8 from unfair dealings with home equity pur-
chasers9 and mortgage foreclosure consultants."0 Often, homeowners experiencing
a period of financial distress will borrow against the equity"' in their homes.' 2 To
secure the loan, the home equity purchaser will take title to the property.'3 The
future intent of the parties is that the homeowner will repurchase the property. 4 To
safeguard the interests of the homeowner, the HESCA allows a homeowner to
cancel a home equity sales contract within five business days after the signing of
the contract, or until eight o'clock in the morning on the day the property is to be
sold, whichever comes first.'5 This "cooling off" period, within which the home-
owner may cancel the contract, is triggered by the signing of the contract.' 6 The Act
requires that a home equity sales contract contain specific notices and disclosures
7. See id. § 1695.1(f) (West 1985) (defining a "property owner" as "the record title owner of the property
in foreclosure at the time the notice of default was recorded").
8. See id. § 1695.1(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (defining a "residence in foreclosure" as residential real
property consisting of one to four-family dwelling units, one of which is owner occupied as a principal place of
residence, against which an outstanding notice of default is recorded).
9. See id § 1695.1(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (defining an "equity purchaser" as one who acquires title
to any residence in foreclosure, and enumerating exceptions to this definition). But see Segura v. McBride, 5 Cal.
App. 4th 1028, 1037, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436,441 (1992) (explaining that the Act regulates not only the predatory pur-
chaser, but all equity purchasers, with the intent to protect the precious asset of home equity).
10. See CAL.CrV.CODE § 1695 (West 1985) (declaringlegislative findings and intent regarding the HESCA);
see also id. § 2945.1(a) (West Supp. 1997) (defining a "mortgage foreclosure consultant" as any person who makes
solicitation to any owner to perform for compensation any of several enumerated services). See generally Review
ofSelected 1979 California Legislation, 11 PAC. LJ. 259,584-92 (1980) (discussing the provisions of the HESCA
at the time of its inception).
11. See BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "equity" as the difference between the fair
market value and the debt in property).
12. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal
Govermnent's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 Tu.. L. REv. 373,388 (1994) (discussing the problem of
predatoy lending).
13. See, e.g., Boquilon v. Beckwith, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1697, 1704, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503, 507 (1996)
(explaining that the home equity purchaser obtained a grant deed out of fear that the homeowner would not pay the
loan).
14. See id. at 1704,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (illustrating a fact pattern in which title was transferred to the
home equity purchaser via a grant deed for the purpose of refinancing the home with the understanding that title
would te transferred back following the refinancing); see also Segura, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 1037-38, 7 Cal. Rptr 2d
at 441-42 (explaining the problems that occur when the homeowner claims a repurchase right to the house which
was never reduced to writing).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.4 (amended by Chapter 50).
16. SENATE RULES CoMMnTEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 2 (June 17, 1997).
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regarding the homeowner's right to cancel. t7 Additionally, during this cooling off
period, the equity purchaser may not: (1) accept an execution of, or induce the seller
to execute, an instrument conveying any interest in the residence in foreclosure; (2)
record any document with the county recorder; (3) transfer or encumber any interest
in the residence being foreclosed to any third party; or (4) pay the equity seller any
consideration. t8 Existing law also provides that a home equity purchaser who
violates provision three, regarding transfer or encumbrance during the cooling off
period, is subject to exemplary, treble damages.' 9 Treble damages are also available
if a home equity purchaser initiated a contract which takes unconscionable
advantage of the property owner in foreclosure. 0
B. The Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants Act
The MFCA was also designed to protect property owners whose homes are in
foreclosure.1 Mortgage foreclosure consultants claim that they can assist these
homeowners, but often they perform no service while charging high fees which are
secured via a deed of trust on the endangered residence.22 Additionally, some home-
owners, who rely on the representations of the consultants, do not investigate other
options and lose their homes, often to the consultant who purchases the foreclosed
property at a reduced price.
23
The MFCA requires a mortgage foreclosure consultant to provide the home-
owner with a written contract containing various disclosures and a notice of the
homeowner's right of cancellation.24 It also enumerates seven violations, the breach
of which provide the homeowner a civil cause of action against the foreclosure con-
sultant.2 A court may, in its discretion, award exemplary damages for any violation
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.3 (amended by Chapter 50) (illustrating the proper form of the contract and
specifying notice that must be included); see also id. § 1695.5 (amended by Chapter 50) (illustrating the proper form
of the notice of right to cancel).
18. See id. § 1695.6(b) (amended by Chapter 50) (enumerating prohibited practices during the cooling
period).
19. Id. § 1695.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997); see id. § 1695.8 (West Supp. 1997) (providing criminal
penalties of fines and imprisonment for equity purchasers who engage in any practice operating as a fraud or deceit
upon an equity seller).
20. Id. § 1695.7 (West 1985); see id. § 1695.13 (West 1985) (prohibiting any person from initiating any
transaction involving residential real property in foreclosure who, by the terms of the transaction, takes
unconscionable advantage of the property owner in foreclosure).
21. See id. § 2945 (West 1993) (stating the legislative intent of the Act).
22. Id.
23. Id.; see Onofrio v. Rice, 55 Cal. App. 4th 413,417, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 75-76 (1997) (detailing facts
that the consultant diverted the plaintiff from genuine assistance, offered a loan at a 35% interest rate which was
secured with a deed of trust, and bought the property after the plaintiff's default).
24. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2945.3 (amended by Chapter 50) (requiring specific disclosures and notice of
cancellation to appear on the contract).
25. See id. § 2945.4 (West 1993) (prohibiting the foreclosure consultant from doing the following: (a)
claiming compensation prior to the full performance of all services; (b) charging any fee, interest, or compensation
which exceeds 10% annually the amount of any loan made to the property owner; (c) taking a wage assignment or
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of the act.26 However, if the court determines that the foreclosure consultant has: (1)
Claimed compensation prior to the performance of all services; (2) claimed a fee,
interest, or compensation in excess of 10% annually of the amount of any loan made
to the property owner; or (3) received consideration from a third party without dis-
closure to the homeowner, and the court chooses to award exemplary damages, then
the court must award damages in an amount at least three times the compensation
received by the consultant.27
Chapter 50 was enacted to strengthen the provisions of both HESCA and
MFCA, as well as to decrease the possibility that HESCA will be misinterpreted. 28
The enactment attempts to eliminate the possibility that consultants may inten-
tionally violate either act to avoid exposure to exemplary treble damages.29 This
possibility was brought to the attention of the legislature by the holding in Boquilon
v. Beckwith," which is expressly abrogated by Chapter 50."
C. The Boquilon v. Beckwith Anomaly
In Boquilon, the court held that the plaintiff homeowners were not entitled to
treble damages when the real estate agent acquired title to the property while the
property was in foreclosure and the plaintiffs were not provided with a written con-
tract.32 The reasoning of the court was that the cooling off period never occurred
lien to secure payment of compensation; (d) receiving consideration from a third party for services rendered the
property owner without disclosure to the owner, (e) acquiring any interest in the residence; (f) taking power of
attorney, or (g) inducing the owner to enter into a contract which does not comply with the Act).
26. Id. § 2945.6 (amended by Chapter 50).
27. See id. (stating that "the court may in its discretion award exemplary damages and shall award exemplary
damages equivalent to at least three times the compensation received by the foreclosure consultant in violation of
subdivision (a), (b), or (d)"). Compare SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 3
(asserting that both prior law and AB 669 "allow" a court to assess exemplary damages if a violation of subsection
(a), (b), or (d) is found, implying that the grant of an award is discretionary), with Onofrio, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 423,
64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80 (asserting that if the court finds the enumerated section 2945.5 violations, the court must
award treble damages, implying that the grant of exemplary damages is mandatory if those violations are found).
28. SENATEFLOOR, ANALYSIS OFAB 69, at 1 (June 17, 1997) (declaring the intent to strengthen provisions
of both acts to protect homeowners in foreclosure); see ASSEMBLY CoMvrrruE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE
ANALYSIS oFAB 669, at 2 (May 13, 1997) (explaining the problem that had arisen in interpreting HESCA).
29. See SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS oFAB 669, at 3-4 (June 17, 1997) (stating the legislative intent to both
abrogate the holding in Boquilon and also to eliminate the incentive to ignore either act in order to avoid treble
damages).
30. 49 Cal. App. 4th 1697, 1715-18,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503,514 (1996).
31. See 1997 Cal. Legis. Ser. ch 50, sec. 6, at 281 (West) (abrogating the holding in Boquilon); see also
SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMITEE, COMMriTEE ANALYSiS OFAB 669, at 3-7 (June 17, 1997) (detailing the Boquilon
problem and the intended effect of Chapter 50).
32. Boquilon, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1713-14, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513-14. See generally SENATE JUDICIARY
CoMrrTEE, COMMrTEEANALYSIS OFAB 669, at4 (June 17, 1997) (explaining the committee's interpretation of
the holding in Boquilon).
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because there was no written contract.3 3 Therefore, the defendant could not have
violated section 1695.6(b)(3) of the Civil Code, which forbids the transfer or
encumbrance of property during the cooling off period.34 Additionally, because
there was no section 1695(b)(3) violation, there was no mandatory assessment of
treble damages pursuant to section 1695.7 of the Civil Code. 35 However, the
defendant was found guilty of a violation of both section 1695.6(a), 6 because she
did not provide a contract commensurate with the act, and section 1695.6(e),
3 7
because she transferred an interest in the property to her husband and also because
she encumbered the property (via refinancing) without the owner's consent.38
Neither of these violations trigger the mandatory treble exemplary damages.39 It is
also important to note that the trial court did not find that the defendant's conduct
was unconscionable, malicious, or deliberate.40
The dissent in Boquilon points out that this statutory interpretation creates a
situation in which a sophisticated equity purchaser may avoid treble damages by
failing to provide a contract, thus violating the fundamental requirement of the
statute.41 Boquilon also creates the anomalous situation in which a purchaser who
provides a contract in compliance with her statutory duty, and then transfers the
property prior to the termination of the cooling off period, may be punished more
33. See Boquilon, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1713-14 n.15, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513-14 n.15 (noting that without
the written contract, there is no way to mark the beginning of the statutory cancellation period); see also SENATE
FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 4 (June, 17, 1997) (explaining that since there was no contract, there was no
cooling off period and therefore, no transfer within the cooling off period).
34. Boquilon, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1713,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513.
35. See CAL CIV. CODE § 1695.7 (West 1985) (awarding mandatory treble damages for any violation of §
1695.6(b)(3) or § 1695.13); see also Boquilon, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1714, 57 Cal. Rptr, at 514 (explaining that
violations other than § 1695.6(b)(3) require the additional unconscionable advantage element of§ 1695.13 in order
to reach the level where mandatory treble damages will be awarded); cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1695.13 (West 1985
& Supp. 1997) (prohibiting transactions in which any person takes unconscionable advantage of the property
owner).
36. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.6(a) (amended by Chapter 50) (requiring the delivery of a contract
conforming to the act).
37. See id. § 1695.6(e) (amended by Chapter 50) (prohibiting an equity purchaser from encumbering or
transferring an interest in the property without written consent of the homeowner).
38. Boquilon, 49 Cal. App 4th at 1712, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-13.
39. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.7 (amended by Chapter 50) (stating that the court "shall award exemplary
damages in an amount not less than three times the equity seller's actual damages" for any violation of §1695.6
(b)(3) or § 1695.13).
40. Boquilon, 49 Cal. App 4th at 1714 n.17, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514 n.17; see infra notes 59-63 and
accompanying text (discussing the due process requirement to consider the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct when assessing exemplary damages).
41. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.6(a) (amended by Chapter 50) (compelling the equity purchaser to provide
the homeowner with a contract conforming to HESCA requirements); see also Boquilon, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1725,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 521 (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting) (referring to the majority's interpretation as an
entrance into the "realm of Alice in Wonderland").
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severely than a culpable purchaser who transfers the property after deliberately
failing to provide the contract.
42
H. LEGISLATIE REMEDIES
Chapter 50 seeks to remedy the problems brought to light in Boquilon by
making specific changes to the Home Equity Contracts Act.43 Additionally, it brings
the Mortgage Foreclosure Consultant's Act into compliance with these changes and
revamps its exemplary damages scheme. 44
The first problem illustrated in Boquilon was that unscrupulous equity
purchasers or mortgage foreclosure consultants could escape liability for treble
damages by failing to provide a contract.45 To remedy this, Chapter 50 allows the
homeowner the right to cancel a home equity sales contract if an equity purchaser
does not provide the homeowner with a contract complying with the act.46 It also
allows a homeowner to cancel a mortgage foreclosure service contract, if the fore-
closure consultant does not provide the homeowner with a contract complying with
the MFCA.47 A contract is in compliance with either act if it is written, includes
specific disclosures, and includes a notice of a right to cancel.48
These measures discourage the practice of failing to provide a written contract
conforming to the Act.49 They also expand the cancellation period to include both
the period of time before a contract is signed, as well as the "cooling off period"
which follows the signing of the contract." This avoids the need to "trigger" the
cancellation period."
42. Boquilon, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1726, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522 (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting); see
SENATE RULES COMMrrEE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 4 (June 17. 1997) (reiterating the arguments of
the dissent as support for Chapter 50).
43. See SENATE RULES COMMrmEE, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 1-3 (June 17, 1997) (detailing
the changes made by Chapter 50 to both the HESCA and the Mortgage Foreclosure Consultant's Act).
44. Id. at 1-3.
45. SENATERuI.ESCommrrrEFCoM?at1EANALYSISOFAB 669, at4 (June 17, 1997).
46. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1695.5(d) (amended by Chapter 50).
47. Id. § 2945.3(g) (amended by Chapter 50).
48. See id. § 1695.3 (West 1985) (providing the required form of a home equity sales contract); see also Id.
§ 1695.5 (amended by Chapter 50) (providing the proper form that the notice of cancellation, which is to be attached
to the home equity sales contract, should take); id. § 2945.3 (amended by Chapter 50) (detailing the compliance
requirements for a mortgage foreclosure consultant contract and providing the form of the notice of cancellation
within the contract).
49. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 2 (May 13, 1997)
(stating a need to clarify the Act due to the perverse incentive created for an equity purchaser who may avoid treble
damages by failing to provide the homeowner with notice of the homeowner's right to rescind).
50. See CAL CIV. CODE §1695.6(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 50) (prohibiting transfer of an interest in the
property tntil the time within which the equity seller may cancel the transaction has fully elapsed); see also SENATL.
RULES COMMITEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 3 (June 17, 1997) (stating that the bill allows a
homeown.-r to cancel a foreclosure consultant services contract until the consultant has complied with the act).
51. SEmATECOMMITTEEANALYSIS,COMMIITEANALYSTSOpAB 669, at 2 (June 17, 1997).
474
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A. Expansion of Exemplary Damages
This expansion of the cancellation period has the effect of allowing treble
damages in home equity sales cases where no conforming contract has been
delivered and the equity purchaser has transferred or encumbered the property.52
Additionally, Chapter 50 expressly provides that a finding of a California Civil
Code section 1695.6(e) violation (transfer of an interest in the property without the
owner's consent) does not preclude the further finding of a California Civil Code
section 1695.6(b)(3) violation (transfer of an interest within the cancellation period)
and it does not preclude the assessment of treble damages because these violations
are not mutually exclusive.53
While Chapter 50 broadens the exemplary damages available to plaintiffs under
the HESCA by including pre-contract time within the ambit of the cooling off
period, the enactment also makes specific changes broadening the exemplary
damage scheme of the Mortgage Foreclosure Consultant Act.
54
Under existing law, the court was permitted to assess, at its discretion,55
exemplary damages of at least three times the compensation received 56 by the fore-
closure consultant if the consultant perpetrated specific, prohibited acts.57 Chapter
50 expands the potential for treble damage awards by allowing a discretionary
assessment of at least three times the owner's actual damages if the consultant: (1)
takes a wage assignment, lien on the property, or other security to secure the
52. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.5(d) (amended by Chapter 50) (allowing the equity seller to cancel a contract
any time prior to the time in which the equity seller has delivered a contract conforming to California Civil Code
§ 1695.4); see also id. § 1695.6(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 50) (making it a violation to transfer an interest within
the cancellation period); id. § 1695.7 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (allowing assessment of treble exemplary damages
for California Civil Code § 1695.6(b)(3) violations).
53. See id. § 1695.6(e) (amended by Chapter 50) (prohibiting an equity purchaser from transferring or
encumbering property without the homeowners consent where the homeowner holds an option to repurchase the
residence); see also id. § 1695.6(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 50) (prohibiting an equity purchaser from transferring
or encumbering the property during the cancellation period); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTE, COMMrrrEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 6 (June 17, 1997) (stating that the provision is necessary to further abrogate the holding
in Boquilon, which stated that the two code sections cannot be applied at the same time).
54. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMIrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 669, at 5 (discussing the goals of
Chapter 50 as providing an indefinite cooling off period, as well as providing treble damages for specific violations
of the Acts).
55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing alternative statutory interpretations regarding the
extent of the court's discretion).
56. See CAL CIv. CODE § 2945.6 (amended by Chapter 50) (stating that the exemplary damages are to be
at least three times the compensation received by the foreclosure consultant in violation of subdivision (a), (b) or
(e) of § 2945.4 of the California Civil Code).
57. See id. § 2945.6 (providing for the assessment of treble damages against a mortgage consultant who
violates subdivisions (c), (e) or (g) of§ 2945.4 of the California Civil Code); see also id. § 2945A(a) (West 1993)
(prohibiting the receipt or demand of compensation by the foreclosure consultant prior to full performance of every
service that the consultant represented they would perform); id. § 2945.4(b) (West 1993) (prohibiting the receipt
or demand of any interest, fee, or compensation which exceeds an annual interest rate of 10% on a loan made by
the foreclosure consultant to the homeowner); id. § 2945.4(d) (West 1993) (prohibiting the receipt of consideration
from a third party for services rendered to an owner without full disclosure to the homeowner).
475
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payment of compensation; (2) acquires an interest in the residence in foreclosure;
or (3) induces or attempts to induce any owner to enter into a contract which does
not comply with the act.
8
B. Exemplary Damages and Due Process Concerns
Even prior to the changes brought by Chapter 50 to the exemplary damages
schemes, there was a potential that the provisions for damages within the Acts were
vulnerable to attack on the basis that they may violate the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution.59 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from taking an
individual's life, liberty or property without due process of law.6 An award of
exemplary damages, often termed punitive damages, can implicate both procedural
and substantive due process concerns.6 ' Procedural due process is violated if a state
uses an unfair procedure to take away life, liberty, or property.62 Substantive due
process concerns arise if a punitive damage award is so grossly excessive as to be
arbitrary.
63
In order to satisfy procedural due process, a State must provide meaningful
standards to guide the application of its laws.6 Fair procedures require proper jury
instructions, post-verdict review by the trial court, and appellate review of the
award.65 If fair procedures are followed, a judgment is entitled to a strong pre-
sumption of validity.6
Several California courts have determined that section 14.17 of B.A.J.I., the
standard punitive damagejury instruction, sufficiently imparts to the jury the nature
and purpose of such an award, so as to comply with federal procedural due process
58. See id § 2945.6 (amended by Chapter 50) (providing for the assessment of damages at least equivalent
to three times the homeowners actual damages for a violation of subsections (c), (e) or (g) of § 2945.4 of the
California Civil Code); see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 2945.4(b) (West 1993) (prohibiting compensation exceeding a
10% annual interest rate on the loan); id. § 2945.4(c) (West 1993) (prohibiting compensation prior to completion
of service); id § 2945.4(g) (West 1993) (prohibiting attempts to induce the homeowner to enter a non-complying
contract).
59. Review of Selected 1979 California Legislation, 11 PAC. L.J. 259,592 (1980).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL CONST. art. I, § 7.
61. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257,274-75 (1989) (using the terms "punitive
damages" and "exemplary damages" interchangeably); see also Christopher V. Carlyle, Big Business Beware:
Punitive Damages Do Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment According to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1397, 1411 (1992) (discussing substantive and procedural due process in the context of
punitive damage awards, in light of Haslip).
62. Carlylesupranole6l,at 1411.
63. Id
64. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 45 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. Compare id. at 23 (reviewing Alabama's jury instructions and system of appellate review and finding
that it meets the fairness requirement of due process), with Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)
(finding that Oregon's lack of appellate review of punitive damage awards violates due process requirements).
66. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,456-57 (1993).
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requirements. 67 In addition, California also requires meaningful judicial scrutiny of
punitive damage awards at both the trial court and appellate levels. 68 Therefore, as
a general matter, California procedure appears to comply with procedural due
process requirements.
While it is permissible for a State to impose punitive damages to further its
legitimate interests in punishing and deterring unlawful conduct, if an award is
"grossly excessive" in relation to these interests, the arbitrary character of the award
may violate substantive due process. 69 To determine whether a particular award is
grossly excessive in relation to the state's interests, three factors must be
considered: (1) The reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the disparity between the
harm suffered and the damages awarded; and (3) the difference between the remedy
imposed and those remedies authorized or imposed in comparable cases.70 The
California Supreme Court has also provided factors that must be considered by a
reviewing court to determine if an award is grossly disproportionate.7 '
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court agree that
punitive damages must be fair in relation to the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct to satisfy substantive due process. 72 The changes to the Home Equity
Contracts Act initiated by Chapter 50 create the potential that an equity purchaser
who transfers property with ignorance of the contractual requirements of the Act
will be held to the same treble damages standard as a culpable equity purchaser who
ignores the requirements of the Act altogether. 3 HESCA's exemplary damage
67. See Las Palmas Assoc. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assoc., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220, 1257, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301,
323 (1991) (finding that BAli 14.71 offers the same protection as the instructions found constitutional in Haslip);
see also Hilgedick v. Kowhring Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76,89 (1992) (determining that B.A.J.I. 14.71 provides
greater protection than the instructions in Haslip), certifiedforpartial publication.
68. See Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 429 (noting that following Haslip, California courts have recognized
the requirement ofjudicial review of punitive damage awards); see also Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 118,
813 P.2d 1348, 1356, 284 Cal. Rptr. 318, 326 (1991) (recognizing the high court's constitutional mandate for
meaningful judicial scrutiny of punitive damages); Las Pamnas Assoc., 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1258 n.8, I Cal. Rptr.
at 324 n.8 (noting that on a motion for a new trial, the trial court sits as an independent trier of fact and may reweigh
the evidence and draw reasonable inferences contrary to those drawn by the jury, that an appellate court has the
responsibility to scrutinize punitive damage verdicts, and opining that on the whole. California law safeguards
satisfy the requirements of due process). See generally infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (explaining the
substantive requirements a reviewing court must consider in order to comply with due process).
69. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589,1595 (1996).
70. Id. at 1598-99.
71. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910,928,582 P.2d 980.990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389,399 (1978)
(enumerating the following factors to be weighed: (1) the nature of the defendant's acts in light of the whole record;
(2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) whether the award exceeds the goals of
punishment and deterrence in light of the defendant's wealth); see also Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 110-13, 813 P.2d at
1350-53, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 321-23 (analyzing the Neal factors in light of Haslip).
72. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1599 (noting that 150 years ago, the Court recognized that
exemplary damages should reflect the enormity of the offense); see also Neal, 21 Cal. 3d at 928, 582 P.2d at 990,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (stating that act of greater reprehensibility demand greater punishment).
73. See CAL. CtV. CODE § 1695.5(d) (amended by Chapter 50) (allowing a right of cancellation until the time
in which the homeowner receives a contract in compliance with the Act); see also id. § 1695.6(b)(3) (West Supp.
1997) (creating a violation of the act if the property is transferred or encumbered during the cancellation period);
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section allows the court the discretion not to assess exemplary damages.74 The
language of the Act distinguishes two situations in which treble damages may be
considered: (1) If the equity purchaser takes unconscionable advantage of the
homeowner; or (2) for a transfer of interest, either without a contract or during the
cooling off period.75 In the latter situation, no express provision has been made to
require a culpable mental state. However, under California tort law, exemplary
damages are only to be awarded if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.76 Consideration of this
standard during damage assessments diminishes the possibility that a punitive
damage award would be grossly disproportionate to the reprehensibility of the
ignorant equity purchaser's conduct. It is also interesting to note that the result in
Boquilon might be the same under Chapter 50 if this standard were used to deter-
mine whether exemplary damages were appropriate. In Boquilon, the trial court
expressly found no evidence of oppression or malice; thus the imposition of
punitive damages might be disproportionate to the reprehensibility of the equity
purchaser's acts.
Another substantive due process question may arise in the context of either the
HESCA or MFCA once the decision to impose exemplary damages has been made
by the court. Both statutes provide only a minimum level of damages assignable and
the court is free to go above this suggested level.77 However, no standards are
provided within either section for determining when it would be appropriate to
exceed the minimum guideline.78 Since Chapter 50 mandates at least treble damages
id. § 1695.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (giving the court discretion to assess treble damages for a transfer or
encumbrance within the cancellation period); Boquilon v. Beckwith. 49 Cal. App. 4th 1697, 1714-15,57 Cal, Rptr.
2d 503, 507 (1996) (considering the possibility that the prior legislative scheme may have been intended to protect
innocent equity purchasers).
74. See CAL. CIr. CODE § 1695.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (granting the court discretion to award
exemplary damages for Home Equity Sales Contract Act violations); see also id. § 2945.6(a) (amended by Chapter
50) (granting the court leave to award exemplary damages against Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants).
75. See id. § 1695.7 (West 1985) (awarding mandatory treble damages for any violation of § 1695.6(b)(3)
or § 1695.13). Cf id. §1695.13 (West 1985) (prohibiting transactions in which any person takes unconscionable
advantage of the property owner); id. § 1695.6(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 50) (prohibiting transfer during the
cancellation period); id. § 1695.5 (amended by Chapter 50) (extending the cancellation period to cover the period
of tim-. before a written contract complying with the act is provided to the homeowner).
76. See id. § 3294(a) (West 1997) (referring to the standards for allowing exemplary damages in "an action
for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract"); see also Las Pahnas Assoc., 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1256
n.7, I Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 322 n.7 (noting that section 3294 of the California Civil Code codifies the common law
regarding punitive damages).
77. See CAL Ctv. CODE § 1695.7(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (setting treble damages as the minimum
level of exemplary damages the court may award for Home Equity Sales Contract Act violations); see also id. §
2945.6(a) (amended by Chapter 50) (setting treble damages as the minimum level of exemplary damages to be
awarded against Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants).
78. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1695.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (demanding at least treble damages, if any
award of exemplary damages is given for Home Equity Sales Contract Act violations); see also id. § 2945.6(a)
(amended by Chapter50) (demanding at least treble damages be given if any award of exemplary damages is given
against Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants).
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if any damages are awarded, it is conceivable that an award may exceed the wealth
of the defendant.79 However, the fact that the initial imposition of exemplary
damages is discretionary may provide the flexibility necessary to avoid this result
80
Additionally, while the lack of discretionary guidelines may lead to a due process
problem, California does have set procedures in place for appellate review of
awards.
Overall, the changes wrought by Chapter 50 to the Home Equity Contracts Act
and the MFCA provide great protection to homeowners who find themselves in the
unfortunate situation of default on their mortgage. 81 The provisions ensuring the
exchange of a written contract in compliance with the act will increase a home-
owner's awareness of his rights under the law. 2 Though there may be a potential
for due process violations in particular cases, it appears that California has a scheme
of appellate review that would both discover any lower court errors relating to
substantive due process issues and satisfy the procedural requirements of due
process as well. 3
III. PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE
While Chapter 50 protects against some of the perils that may befall home-
owners whose homes are in foreclosure, Chapter 65 seeks to protect unsophisticated
homeowners from overpaying their Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI).8 Generally,
lenders require PMI when a borrower does not have a twenty percent down
payment.85 The purpose of PMI is not to insure the borrower, but to protect the
lender against financial loss in the event of the borrower's default.8 6 PMI promotes
79. See id. § 1695.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (demanding at least treble damages, if any award of
exemplary damages is given for Home Equity Sales Contract Act violations); see also id. § 2945.6(a) (amended by
Chapter 50) (demanding at least treble damages be given if any award of exemplary damages is given against
Mortgage Foreclosure Consultants); supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the California standard
requiring that an award not exceed the goals of punishment and deterrence in light of the defendant's wealth).
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (illustrating the judicial discretion involved in assessing
exemplary damages).
81. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ONJUDICIARY, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS oFAB 669, at 2 (May, 13, 1997).
82. See id. (noting that before Chapter 50, in an effort to avoid punitive damage assessment, equity
purchasers would purposely neglect to provide homeowners with notice of their right to rescind).
83. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text (discussing the federal guidelines for due process and the
standard of review of punitive damage awards in California).
84. See SENATE RULES COMMrrr, CoMMrrEE ANALYSIS oF AB 1160, at 3 (June 19, 1997) (stating that
many borrowers do not understand what private mortgage insurance is and are unaware that they may cancel the
coverage if certain conditions are met).
85. Id:
86. See CAL. INS. CODE § 12640.02(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (defining "mortgage guaranty insurance");
see also 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02, 1559 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (statement of Congressman Hansen) (stating
that PMI should not be confused with a homeowner's protection policy as it does not insure the borrower).
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home ownership in that it allows homeowners to purchase homes with as little as
three to 5% as a down payment.
87
As the debt on the loan is paid down, the lender's risk decreases because there
is more equity in the real estate.8 8 Most mortgage servicer's guidelines allow
cancellation when the loan to value ratio (LTV) of the property is at 807.89
However, often homeowners are not even aware that they may cancel their PMI. 0
Also, the cancellation procedures instituted by lenders may exact a high level of
both time and frustration on the part of the homeowner.9' It has been estimated that
at least 250,000 homeowners nationwide are overpaying their PMI.
92
Existing law provides that a homeowner may cancel their PMI when certain
conditions are met.93 Chapter 65 requires automatic cancellation of PMI by the
insurance company when the following conditions are met: (1) the encumbered real
property is an owner-occupied, one-to-four unit, residential property; (2) the loan
amount owed is equal to or less than 75% of the sales price or appraised value; (3)
the borrower is current on payments and no more than one of the borrower's
scheduled monthly payments has been thirty days past due within the last twelve
months; and (4) the loan was executed after January 1, 1998. 9' Additionally, state
and federally administered mortgages are exempted from the operation of Chapter
65.'5
The progressive nature of Chapter 65 is illustrated by the difficulty consumers
face in other states when canceling their PMI.96 In 1996, class actions were pending
in four states against lenders, servicers or insurance companies.97 Additionally,
87. 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02, 1562 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (floor statement of Rep. Roukema).
88. SEtATERULESCoMMrrTEE, CoMMTTEE ANALYSIS oF AB 1160, at 3 (June 19, 1997).
89. John Dawson, Defenses to Clahns Asserting a "Duty" to Cancel Private Mortgage Insurance, 396
PRAC. L. INST. CORP. HANDBOOK 711, 714 (1996). See generally 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02, 1559 (daily ed. Apr.
16, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hansen) (discussing cancellation guidelines).
90. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMINITEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1160, at 3 (June 17, 1997)
(commenting that most borrowers do not know what PMI is or that they are allowed to cancel it).
91. See 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02, 1560 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hansen) (indicating
that Congressman Hansen himself had to fight with his servicer for four years to cancel his PMl).
92. See id. (stating that of the 2.1 million home mortgages insured in 1996, one million required PMI and
that at least 250,000 homeowners nationally are overpaying their PMI at an average monthly cost of $30 to $100).
93. See CAL Civ. CODE § 2954.7(a) (West 1993) (allowing a borrower to cancel PM! if: (1) the request to
cancel is in writing; (2) the origination date of the note is at least two years prior to the request for cancellation; (3)
the encumbered property is an owner-occupied, one to four unit residential real property; (4) the unpaid balance
on the note is less than 75% of either the original sale price of the property or the appraisal value of the property,
and (5) the borrower's payments have not been more than 30 days past due of the 24 month period immediately
preceding the request, and no notice of default has been recorded pursuant to § 2924 of the California Civil Code).
94. Id. § 2954.12(a) (enacted by Chapter 65).
95. See id. § 2954.12(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 65) (exempting loans funded pursuant to authority granted
by statute that prohibits termination of PMI payments during the term of indebtedness).
96. See Dawson. supra note 89, at 718-21 (enumerating unsuccessful legal theories advanced in several
jurisdictions in an attempt to force lenders to either make disclosures or cancel PMI).
97. See id. at 716 (noting that class actions were pending in Alabama, Texas, Minnesota, and New Jersey
against the various companies).
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plaintiffs often have difficulty finding a legal theory to support their claim that their
PMI payments should be canceled.98
PMI plays a valuable role in expanding home ownership by enabling buyers to
purchase homes with small down payments.99 Additionally, PMI helps reduce the
economic impact of downturns in the housing market by providing security for high
risk loans through insuring lenders against defaulting borrowers.' ° Chapter 65
strikes a delicate balance between these interests. By maintaining the LTV ratio at
75%, lenders maintain security against default and consumers are protected, through
the automatic cancellation provision, against paying needless premiums when their
risk drops to acceptable levels.""
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of both Chapter 50 and Chapter 65 is to protect the interests of
unsophisticated homeowners." Chapter 65 effectuates this intent by eliminating the
frustration involved in obtaining cancellation of PMI by requiring automatic
cancellation."t 3 At the same time, it protects lenders by requiring a loan to value
ratio less than 75% before cancellation."° Chapter 50, in expressly abrogating the
holding of Boquilon, protects homeowners from both culpable and ignorant equity
purchasers and foreclosure consultants.'0 5 However, care must be taken so that this
protection does not come at the price of the due process rights of innocent but
ignorant equity purchasers.'
98. See id. at 717-22 (listing various causes of action that have been advanced to remedy the inequity of
allowing consumers to continue paying for PMI when they receive no direct benefit, and the lenders receive little
benefit).
99. 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02, 1562 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997) (statement of Congresswoman Roukema).
100. Representative James Hansen, The Truth Behind Private Mortgage Insurance (visited July 30, 1997)
<http://www.house.gov/hansen/overvw.htm>.
101. see ASSEMBLY FLOOR, ANALYSIs OF AB 1160, at 2 (May 2, 1997) (commenting that the lender's risk
decreases significantly once the LTV ratio is at 80%); see also 143 CONG. REC. H1557-02,1562 (daily ed. Apr. 16,
1997) (statement of Rep. Roukema) (discussing the importance of balancing competing interests in federal
legislation requiring automatic cancellation of PMI).
102. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of Chapters 50 and 65).
103. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (illustrating the legislative intent of Chapter 65 as well
as the frustration some borrowers face in obtaining cancellation).
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (exploring the benefits of a 75% LTV ratio as a prerequisite
to PMI cancellation).
105. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text (explaining how the changes to HESCA and MFCA
protect homeowners by encouraging compliance with the contract provisions of the Acts and by expanding the
treble damage provisions of each Act).
106. See discussion supra Part 11.B (discussing potential due process concerns related to the exemplary
damage provisions of both the HESCA and the MFCA).

